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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-4103(2)(j). This case was poured over from the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

The standard of review for Rule 11, and the statement of issues on cross

appeal are set forth at page 42 below.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action is the third in a series of actions initiated by the Gillmors seeking to
obtain expanded use of two mountain trails that traverse property initially owned by
David Richards. ( R. 1). The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs claims based upon
defendants' motion to dismiss. ( R. 154). The trial court also awarded sanctions against
Gillmor's counsel. ( R. 195). Both parties have appealed the trial court's rulings
The following facts provide a statement of the case:
1.

All of the property that is at issue, apart from the Gillmor property, was

initially owned by David K. Richards or David K. Richards & Company ("Richards").
(See 2nd Am. Comply Case No. 010600155 (the "2001 Action"), ffi[l-3; Ex. 1 to Def.
Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss, R. 31).
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2.

The property now owned by Nadine Gillmor ("Gillmor"), the plaintiff, was

previously owned by her now deceased husband, Charles F. Gillmor, Jr.

(2nd Am.

Compl.,ffl[2-3;R.31,Ex. 1.)
3.

An action was commenced in 1984 in the Third District Court in Summit

County by Gillmor's late husband, Charles F. Gillmor, against Richards seeking an
injunction against Richards' alleged interference with Charles Gillmor's use of the Perdue
Creek and Neil Creek roads. (2nd Am. Compl., ^ 3, Ex. 1 and Complaint in Civil No.
8065 (the "1984 Action") Ex.2, both attached to R. 31.
4.

The 1984 Action was settled in November, 1985, by way of an Easement

and Use Agreement (the "1985 Agreement") which granted Charles F. Gillmor easements
for limited purposes across the Perdue Creek road and portions of the Neil Creek road.
(See Ex. A attached to Order, Ex. 3, to Def. Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J., R. 31.) The
Agreement, dated November 21, 1985, provided in ^f 8 that it was "binding upon and shall
inure to the benefit of the parties hereto [Frank Gillmor and David K. Richards &
Company], their officers, directors, invitees, agents, employees, heirs, personal
representatives, successors, assigns, owners, occupants and lessees..." (Id.)
5.

The 1985 Agreement further provides that:
Gillmor hereby covenants and agrees that he shall not use the
Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his invitees, agents,
or employees in such a manner so as to cause the Easements to
become part of the public domain. Gillmor specifically covenants
and agrees that he shall not allow the Gillmor property to be used in
such a manner so as to subject the Easements to demands by the
public for access to any portion of the Gillmor property.

2

(Paragraph 2, pp. 2 and 3 of Ex. A attached to the Order, which is Ex. 3 to R.31.)
6.

The Order dismissing the 1984 Action dismissed ".. .all plaintiffs claims...

with prejudice and on the merits. .." (Ex. 3 to R.31.)
7.

In 2001, Nadine Gillmor filed suit against Robin Macey, Ken Macey,

Family Link, and ultimately, David K. Richards seeking, among other things, injunctive
relief prohibiting the defendants from interfering with her and her family's use of the
Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads, and for a declaration of her rights under the 1985
Agreement. (Ex. 1 to R.31.)
8.

The 2001 Action was tried to the district court over six days in March 2002.

At the conclusion of the trial, Judge Hilder penned his own Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. (Ex. 4 to R. 31)
9.

Among other things, Judge Hilder found (R.31, Ex. 4) the following facts:
13.
. . . The evidence, however, made it clear that while historic
use has significant weight, the [1985 Agreement] was a compromise
on both sides, with an inevitable and knowing departure from at least
some historic uses.
15.
. . . As part of [Richards'] desire to minimize traffic and
damage, Richards intended by the agreement to insure that Gillmor
not be permitted to develop his property in any way by use of the
Richards' property that could support a claim that the access routes
had become public roads.
16. For his part, Gillmor wanted to preserve his immediate
family's general access, preserve a right he claimed historically to
trail livestock, and preserve or secure a right of access for the
Howard group in order that he could continue his agreement with
them to trade maintenance for hunting and recreation rights. To
accomplish his overall purpose, Gillmor clearly intended to give up
his claimed to historical right to use the Neil Creek access (except
3

for emergency egress), and to generally use only the less desirable
Perdue Creek road, subject to his right to maintain, and to improve as
necessary, the Perdue Creek access.
18.
Richards' intention that Gillmor could use his property as he
wished included Gillmor's right to construct additional structures,
but Richards absolutely did not intend that Gillmor could use the
servient property [the Neil Creek or Perdue Creek roads] to aid such
construction in any way. The parties did not intend, and the
agreement does not provide, for Gillmor to use the servient property
for construction access in any form, such as transportation of
building materials or construction workers. The parties did negotiate
to allow access for animal husbandry, but that provision was never
intended to be construed so broadly as to allow access to construct
residential dwellings.
10.

On or about September 24, 2002, Judge Hilder entered a judgment (Ex. 5 to

R. 31) in the 2001 Action which provides (in Section 3 at p. 4), among other things, as
follows:
This [1985 easement] may not be used to engage in new construction
on the Gillmor property, in the guise of maintenance. Access for any
work on the Gillmor property that does not fit clearly within the
definition of access route maintenance must qualify as "animal
husbandry."
11.

Gillmor appealed Judge Hilder's judgment. Richards and Maceys cross-

appealed. On August 25, 2005, the Court of Appeals issued its decision in Gillmor v.
Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57.
12.

Among other things, the Court of Appeals sustained the trial court's finding

that Gillmor could not use either the Perdue Creek or the Neil Creek road for purposes of
cabin construction. (2005 UT App. 351, ^ 28-29) The Court of Appeals made two
additional observations as follows:

4

However, given our conclusion, the grant of access is narrow as to
those it benefits. . .. flf 23)
As a result, the purposes for which invitees may use the easements
are limited to those expressly addressed in the agreement. fl[ 25)
13.

Neither the 1984 Complaint (R. 31, Ex. 2) nor the 2001 Second Amended

Complaint (R. 31, Ex. 1) assert any claim for relief based upon the theories presented in
the present litigation, i.e., that the Neil Creek or Perdue Creek roads had acquired status
as public thoroughfares, or that Gillmor was entitled to private condemnation of the
roadways pursuant to UCA § 78-34-1 (now § 78B-6-501).
14.

Gillmor filed this action in July, 2007. (Compl., R. 1.)

15.

Defendants Ken Macey, Robin Macey and David Richards served Gillmor's

counsel with a Motion for Sanctions Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure and Memorandum in Support of the Motion on August 6, 2007. (R. I l l )
16.

Defendants' filed their Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for

Summary Judgment on August 31, 2007. (R. 21)

Gillmor cross-moved for partial

summary judgment on her condemnation claim on October 10, 2007. (R. 70)
17.
110.)

The Court heard argument on the cross-motions on December 19, 2007. (R.

In the course of the hearing, counsel for Gillmor acknowledged that he had

informed Gillmor that the Defendants had "a pretty good argument in this case [on claim
preclusion.]" {Id. at 31). Counsel also acknowledged that Gillmor could have brought
the two claims asserted in this action in the 2001 Action but said that doing so would
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have been "dicey" because Gillmor was claiming in that action to have extensive private
rights under the Easement Agreement. {Id. at 40.)
18.

Counsel for Gillmor repeatedly urged the Court not to grant defendants'

Motion to Dismiss on res judicata grounds because he would simply find another
plaintiff, not involved in the earlier cases, to bring the road-by-use-claim. Counsel stated,
"And frankly if the Court dismisses this, I'll bring it in somebody else's name as well."
(R. 110 at 27). Counsel also argued that dismissing Gillmor's suit would not serve the
purpose of conserving judicial resources intended by res judicata because he would find
another plaintiff to bring the road-by-use claim, going so far as to say, "I'll find
somebody off the street" if necessary. {Id. at 33).
19.

Judge Hilder, the same judge that tried the 2001 Action, dismissed the 2007

Action, stating that '\r]es judicata bars all claims that were or could have been brought in
prior litigation between the same parties or their privies concerning the same operative
facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in this case could have been brought in Gillmor v.
Macey et al., Civil No. 010600155, Third District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards,
Civil No. 8065, Third District Court, 1984." (R. 154 at 155) After the Court had
announced its ruling, Gillmor's counsel stated, "It's going to go up on appeal and we'll
find another plaintiff and we'll do it again." (R. 110 at p. 62,1. 6-8.)
20.

There is no allegation in the 2007 Complaint that Gillmor's property is

landlocked. The allegation in paragraph 9 of the Complaint is that the property is
"essentially landlocked". (Compl., R. 1.) In the 2001 Action, the Court found that other
6

means of access have been used to get to the Gillmor property. (R. 31, Ex. 4, ^ 21).
Gillmor concedes for the first time in her brief before this Court, that the Perdue Creek
and Neil Creek roads are merely the "most convenient" for her use. (Appellant Br. at 3).
21.

No allegation was made in the 2007 Complaint that the 1984 or the 2001

Actions had been brought against less than all of the owners of the property between the
Weber Canyon Highway and Gillmor's property, and over which the Perdue Creek and
Neil Creek roads pass on their way to the Gillmor property. (Compl., R. 1.) In fact,
Gillmor conceded as much in her pleadings opposing the motion to dismiss. (Compare
Statement of Fact ^ 2, R. 36, with PI. Mem. Opp'n Mot. Dismiss, at 2, R. 71. ("The
statement of undisputed facts... is adopted by Plaintiff in totoP)
22.

Defending the previous case brought by Gillmor in 2001, through discovery

and six days of trial, post trial motions, on appeal before the Court of Appeals and on the
Motion for Writ of Certiorari before the Utah Supreme Court cost David Richards and the
Maceys over $100,000.00 each. (R. 229, p. 10).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed because the Brief of Appellant
fails to comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Gillmor's
failure to make a concise statement of the facts cited to the pages of the record where
those facts are supported, permits this Court to assume the correctness of the judgment
below.
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The judgment should be affirmed for the further reason that this action is barred by
res judicata or claim preclusion. This action involves the same parties or their assigns as
the two earlier actions, makes claims that could have been asserted in the earlier actions
and both of those actions resulted in judgments on the merits.
Gillmor now asserts that her claims in this action are not barred because they
should have been analyzed under the doctrine of issue preclusion and because there was a
change in the law after the 2001 action. However, she did not raise issue preclusion
arguments in the trial court, and for that reason they should not be considered.
Additionally, there has been no change in the law precluding application ofres judicata.
The judgment should be affirmed on the alternative grounds of judicial estoppel.
Gillmor's position in this action that the Perdue and Neil Creek roads are public is
contrary to the positions taken by Gillmor in the earlier suits that the roads are private.
On the basis of that earlier position Gillmor and her predecessor obtained significant
access over the roads which would otherwise not have been obtained.

Gillmor is

therefore estopped from now claiming that the roads are public.
Finally, the trial court properly awarded sanctions under Rule 11(b)(2) against
Gillmor's counsel because the claims in this action were clearly barred by res judicata.
Counsel for Gillmor failed to provide the trial court with any cogent authority supporting
Gillmor's contention that res judicata should not bar this action.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE
APPELLANT'S BRIEF FAILS TO COMPLY WITH UTAH R. APP. P. 24.
8

Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the brief of
the appellant must contain:
A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings
below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with
paragraph (e) of this rule. (Emphasis added.)
Failure to cite to the record as required significantly impedes the Court's ability to
dispose of the case before it and is sanctionable. Koulis v. Std. Oil Co., 746 P.2d 1182,
1184 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).1 If a party fails to make a concise statement of the facts and
citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will assume
the correctness of the judgment below. Id. see also Phillips v. Hatfield, 904 P.2d 1108
(Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("[Appellant's] brief failed to conform to the requirements of Rule
24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Therefore, we decline to address

[Appellant's] argument on appeal and affirm the trial court's order....").
Appellant Gillmor's brief contains not a single citation to the record in the
Statement of the Case, the Statement of Relevant Facts or the Argument.

Not

surprisingly, many of the briefs statements concerning the facts and the course of
proceedings are factually incorrect or completely without support in the record. For
instance, Gillmor states that this action is the first action brought "against all the
landowners who block her property from declared public roads, not just Mr. Richards and
l Koulis was decided under the Rules of the Supreme Court, the requirements of which
were carried into Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7).
9

his successors-in interest." (Appellant Br. at 4). The record below demonstrates that: (i)
Gillmor admitted that Richards was the defendant in the 1984 action brought by
Gillmor's predecessor in interest, Charles Frank Gillmor, and originally owned all of the
property between the Weber Canyon Road and the Gillmor property traversed by the
Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads, and (ii) that all defendants in the 2001 Action and
this action claim through Richards. (R. 36, Statement of Facts, ^ 2; and R. 71, p. 1.)
Similarly, Gillmor claims in her brief that defendants gave the notice required by Utah R.
Civ. P. 11 that sanctions would be sought on the basis of their arguments concerning both
res judicata and judicial estoppel. (Appellant Br. at 4-5 n.l). The record demonstrates
that the defendants sought Rule 11 sanctions only on the basis of their res judicata
argument. (R. 114 at 120)
Gillmor's failure to cite to the record as required by Rule 24 has resulted in a
distortion of the presentation of the proceedings below and the facts relevant to this case.
The Court should therefore assume the correctness of the trial court decision and affirm
that decision.
II.

GILLMOR'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY RES JUDCA TA
The trial court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the basis ofres judicata.

(See Order, at f 1, R. 155). Specifically, the trial court ruled that "res judicata bars all
claims that were or could have been brought in prior litigation between the same parties
or their privies concerning the same operative facts or controversy. Plaintiffs claims in
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this case could have been brought in [two prior cases]." Id. Gillmor fails to show that
this determination constitutes reversible error.
Res judicata refers to the doctrine that gives judgments preclusive effect in
subsequent litigation. Brigham Young Univ. v. Tremco Consultants, Inc., 2005 UT 19,
T| 25, 110 P.3d 678. It prevents a litigant from pursuing a claim through "piecemeal
litigation, offering one legal theory to the court while holding others in reserve for future
litigation should the first prove unsuccessful." Am. Estates Mgmt. v. InVl Inv. & Dev.
Corp., 1999 UT App 232, f 14, 986 P.2d 765 (citation omitted); see also In re J J J., 877
P.2d 161, 162 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("[T]he proper administration of justice is best served
by limiting parties to one fair trial of an issue or cause."). Moreover, it serves the "vital
public interests" of "(1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing
inconsistent decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits;
and (4) conserving judicial resources." Office of Recovery Servs. v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944,
946 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
The policy promoting finality in judgments is particularly relevant in cases
involving title to real property: "When . . . title to real property is at issue, the need for
finality is at its apex." Am. Estates Mgmt., 1999 UT App 232, \ 10 (holding that claim
preclusion barred adverse possession claim in second action seeking to quiet title to
parking space since that claim should have been brought in prior action that alleged
breach of contract for failing to convey the same property); see also Wheadon v. Pearson,
376 P.2d 946, 948 (Utah 1962) {res judicata barred defendants from trying to establish a
11

right of way by implied easement when their prior case seeking to obtain the same relief
by way of prescriptive easement had been dismissed; plaintiff "should be denied a second
attempt at substantially the same objective under a different guise").
This Court should affirm the trial court's determination because each of the
elements required to establish claim preclusion are present here, and Gillmor does not
quality for any exceptions. To the extent Gillmor now argues that the trial court should
have applied issue preclusion - rather than claim preclusion or a change-in-the-law
exception - these arguments were not preserved for appeal.
A. Gillmor did not preserve her issue preclusion arguments below.
Gillmor's opening brief seems to advance a theory based on issue preclusion. (See
Appellant Br. at § I). Gillmor also argues that res judicata is not applicable to this case
because there has been an intervening change in the law. Neither of these theories were
argued below. For instance, in her memorandum opposing dismissal, Gillmor argued
only that claim preclusion did not apply because "...there are narrow exceptions to the
claim preclusion rule. It is on those exceptional principles that Plaintiff brings her
complaint to the Court/' (R. 71.) The only "exceptions" argued by Gillmor, however,
were (a) amorphous "public policy" or equitable exceptions to claim preclusion and (b) a
so-called "change in the operative facts" exception to claim preclusion. Id. at 12-1 A.
There is no mention of either issue preclusion or the "change in the law" exception to res
judicata. Accordingly, Gillmor's new theories should not be addressed by this Court.
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"Issues not raised at trial are usually deemed waived and cannot be argued for the
first time on appeal." Doug Jessop Const., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App 348, % 18, 195
P.3d 493 (citation omitted). "As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court
may not be raised on appeal ... unless a [litigant] can demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances exist or plain error occurred. Provo City v. Ivie, 2008 UT App 287, ^| 5,
191 P.3d 841 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Marchandv. Marchand,
2006 UT App 429, f 8, 147 P.3d 538 (same).
An issue is not preserved unless it is "presented to the trial court in such a way that
the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." hunt v. Lance, 2008 UT App 192,
Tf 23, 186 P.3d 978 (citation omitted). "This puts the trial court on notice of any asserted
error and allows the court to correct such error in the course of the proceeding." Doug
Jessop Const., Inc., 2008 UT App 348, \ 18. For a trial court to rule effectively on an
issue, three requirements must be met:
(1) 'the issue must be raised in a timely fashion'; (2) 'the issue must
be specifically raised5; and (3) a party must introduce 'supporting
evidence or relevant legal authority.' Id. (quoting Hart v. Salt Lake
County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct.App.1997)).
Id. None of these requirements have been met by Gillmor.
In addition, Gillmor has failed to show that an exception to this general rule
applies. "This preservation rule has been extended to apply to every claim unless a
[party] can demonstrate that exceptional circumstances exist or plain error occurred."
hunt, 2008 UT App 192, f 23 (quotations and citations omitted).

The exceptional

circumstances doctrine is "used sparingly, properly reserved for truly exceptional
13

situations, for cases ... involving rare procedural anomalies...and [may be employed]
where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law color[s] the failure to have
raised an issue at trial/' Provo City, 2008 UT App 287, \ 6 (quotations and citations
omitted), while, "to prevail under a plain error analysis, an error must have occurred, that
error should have been apparent to the trial court, and the error must be harmful," Classic
Cabinets, Inc. v. All American Life Ins. Co., 1999 UT App 88, U 17, 978 P.2d 465
(citation omitted). Gillmor does not argue that either exception applies here; indeed,
Gillmor does not even mention these exceptions.
Further, as part of the preservation rule, an appellant is required to "ccit[e] to the
record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court.'" hunt, 2008 UT App 192,
% 23 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)), or to provide a "statement of grounds for
review of an issue not preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B). Gillmor
has failed to meet either requirement.
The purpose for the general rule is plain: "The trial court is considered the proper
forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of issues.... Failing to
argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that forum denies the trial court the
opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law pertinent to the claimed
error." Marchand, 2006 UT App 429, % 8 (quotations and citations omitted).
Gillmor has apparently abandoned the "exceptional principles" theory, and now
wants to argue that issue preclusion, rather than claim preclusion, applies to her claims.
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Because Gillmor failed to present this argument to the trial court, this Court should refuse
to address the same.
B. Gillmor's claims are barred by claim preclusion.
Res judicata has two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Brigham
Young Univ., 2005 UT 19, ^f 25.

"Claim preclusion involves the same parties or their

privies and also the same cause of action, 'and this precludes the relitigation of all issues
that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact, litigated in the prior
action.'" Maoris & Assocs. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, \ 19, 16 P.3d 1214 (citation
omitted, emphasis added).
For claim preclusion to apply, three elements must be satisfied: "(I) [T]he
subsequent action must involve the same parties, their privies, or their assigns as the first
action, (2) the claim to be barred must have been brought or have been available in the
first action, and (3) the first action must have produced a final judgment on the merits of
the claim." Brigham Young Univ., 2005 UT 19, U 26.
1. This action involved the same parties or their assigns.
There was no dispute in this matter regarding the first element of claim preclusion,
i.e., that the actions involve the "same parties or their assigns". In the 2001 Action and
in this action, Nadine Gillmor is the plaintiff. In both cases, Family Link, Ken and Robin
Macey, and David Richards (either personally or in his corporate capacity) are
defendants. The 1984 Action involved Gillmor's predecessor and Richards. (R. 31, Ex.
2) To the extent the 2007 Complaint names more or different defendants than the 2001
15

Complaint, it adds them as parties claiming an interest flowing from Richards. The
defendants in this case all claim through Richards. (R. 36, para. 2)

In other words,

regardless of the identity of named parties, both the 2001 and 2007 complaints (as well as
the 1984 Action) name the same parties in interest, namely: (1) the owner of the dominant
estate claiming an interest or use in the rights of way at issue; and (2) all of the owners of
the servient estates over which the claimed right of ways run or which are burdened by
the claimed use. Ultimately, these circumstances were not disputed by Gillmor before the
trial court. There are not, as Gillmor suggests for the first time in her brief (Appellant Br.
at 4), other landowners who own property over which these trails pass between her
property and the Weber Canyon highway. (See Statement of Facts, supra, ^ 21.)
2. This action involves claims that could have been asserted in prior actions.
With respect to the second element of claim preclusion, separate claims are subject
to claim preclusion where they arise from the same state of facts and the same kind of
evidence is necessary to sustain either cause of action. Macris, 2000 UT 93, \ 28.
"[W]here the different causes of action are based on the same set of operative facts, it is
clear that principles of preclusion demand that the claims be litigated in a single setting."
Nipper v. Douglas, 2004 UT App 118 n.2, 90 P.3d 649. See also Lane v. Honeywell, Inc.,
663 F. Supp. 370, 373 (D. Utah 1987) (a plaintiff must assert "all theories for relief
against a defendant with respect to all or any part of a transaction, or series of transactions
out of which the action arose"); Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist., 2004 UT App 33, ^f 3, 86 P.3d
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are given the capacity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so."
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, 1357 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(citation omitted).

Claim preclusion bars "all issues which the party had a fair

opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding."

Jacobsen v.

Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 1985) (citation omitted). "If a party fails, purposely
or negligently, to make good his cause of action by all proper means within his control, he
will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of that determination, nor to
relitigate the same matters between the same parties." Am. Estates Mgmt., 1999 UT App
232, ^J 12 (citation, internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). In particular, a claim
is one that "could" and "should" have been brought where it arose prior to the complaint
in the first action, or where at the time of the first complaint the claimant was aware of
the facts upon which he bases his later claim. Macris, 2000 UT 93, ^ 9-13.
In Am. Estate Mgmt., supra, AEM sued a prior owner/business partner in 1982
claiming rights to a parking area based upon various written and oral agreements. Some
15 years later, after an unsatisfactory result in the 1982 action, AEM sued over the same
property, now alleging that it had acquired the parking area by adverse possession. This
Court reviewed the trial court's dismissal of the second action based on a finding that the
claim was barred by res judicata, relying on claim preclusion. Even though the cause of
action in the first action was based on written agreements, and the second action was
based on adverse possession, this Court concluded that because the adverse possession
claim could and should have been asserted in the prior action, it was barred by claim
18
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ruling that "Plaintiffs claims in this case could have been brought in Gillmor v. Macey et
al., Civil No. 010600155, Third District Court 2001, or in Gillmor v. Richards, Civil No.
8065, Third District Court, 1984." (Order, R. 154 at 155)
Each of the causes of action asserted in 2001 and in 2007 seek the same relief, i.e.,
broader, unlimited use of the roads.

The claims were perhaps best summarized by

statements made by Gillmor's counsel to the trial court as follows: "The theory is Ms.
Gillmor wants access. . ." (R. 110, p. 37, 1. 21-22.)

Pleading the public use and

condemnation claims for the first time in 2007 is precisely the type of piecemeal litigation
of the same controversy that claim preclusion is meant to prevent.
Gillmor argues in her brief (pp. 5-11) that res judicata cannot apply because the
prior actions and the 2007 action do not involve the "same causes of action". In stating
the premise, Gillmor acknowledges her argument is missing the mark. As discussed
above, claim preclusion is not about "legal theories" or "causes of action", but about the
claim being pursued, here claims of access over the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek roads.
In making this argument, Gillmor relies on four cases: Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d
1337 (Utah 1983); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); Hill v. Seattle First
Natl Bank, 827 P.2d 241 (Utah 1992); and Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P. 2d 689 (Utah
1978).
In Schaer, the Court recognized the broader rule that res judicata "...precludes the
relitigation of all issues that could have been litigated as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action..." Schaer, 657 P. 2d at 1340 (citation omitted). Schaer
20
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would be no requirement that a complaining party bring all of their claims against an
adversary in a single proceeding. In all three cases, the 1984 case, the 2001 case, and the
2007 action, Gillmor sought the same result, i.e., broader, if not unbridled, use of the
Perdue and Neil Creek roads over defendants' property.
Gillmor next relies on Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948), an appeal
from a tax court. In Sunnen, the Supreme Court concluded that where similar cases may
involve different tax years, and different tax laws, the law of collateral estoppel must be
carefully applied.

Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 599-600.

The Supreme Court went on to

conclude, based upon factors unique to tax courts, that the tax payer was not bound by a
prior determination of tax liability based on prior years returns. The Supreme Court
recognized that res judicata applies "'not only as to every matter which was offered and
received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter
which might have been offered for that purpose/" Id. at 597 (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).

Thus, Sunnen is readily distinguishable by its unique facts, and

supportive of defendants' position through the Court's recognition of the principle
advanced by defendants in this action, i.e., that if Gillmor had claims related to her use of
the roads that could have been asserted in 2001, she was obligated to raise them in 2001.
The next case relied on by Gillmor, Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P. 2d
241 (Utah 1992), also presents a unique fact situation. Hill had been involved in a federal
court action against Citizens Bank of Ogden. Citizens had failed and been taken over by
the FDIC. Seattle First was never served and did not participate in the federal action.
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court, but the trial court's decision was largely affirmed on appeal.

See Gillmor v.

Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57, cert.denied, 126 P.3d 772 (UT 2005).
The 2001 Complaint was a dispute over Gillmor's right to use the road based on
the terms of the 1985 Agreement, which in turn was the settlement agreement for the
1984 litigation that sought use of the same roads under theories of prescriptive use. The
settlement in the 1984 litigation resulted in an express easement defining the location and
scope of an easement in favor of Gillmor over the two roads on Defendants' properties.
As such, the settlement reached in that case (as well as the Order of Dismissal (R. 31, Ex.
3) also provides a basis for claim preclusion in this case. See Salt Lake City v. Silver
Fork Pipeline Corp., 913 P.2d 731, 733 (Utah 1995) (noting that courts have held that a
stipulation between adverse parties can be considered a final judgment on the merits
sufficient to invoke claim preclusion in a subsequent suit between the same parties). The
Order dismissing Gillmor's claims in the 1984 action was with "prejudice on the merits."
(R. 31, Ex. 3) The 2001 action was nothing more than another attempt by Gillmors to
obtain broader access to the roads. Gilmore admits that the present action includes claims
that could have been brought in at least the 2001 action (R. 229, p. 29, 1.9), again related
to Gillmor's use of the roads.
Claim preclusion bars Gillmor's claims in this matter. She is attempting to achieve
the same objective of the prior two litigations "under a different guise." She is merely
applying new and hitherto unplead causes of action to achieve access. All the elements
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\s

in the law creating an altered situation"); Marino v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (concluding that
"no judgment can affect subsequently arising rights and duties"). To
invoke this exception, a party must establish that a new
substantive right has been created. Besing v. Vanden Eykel, 878
S.W.2d 182, 184-85 (Tex.App.1994) (ruling that a change regarding
the applicable statute of limitations did not create a new substantive
right). Whether a new substantive right has been created by a
judicial opinion issued after the party's original suit has been
decided, however, requires, at a minimum, an actual change in
the law.
Collins, 2002 UT 77, at f 14 (emphases added).
Following these principles, the Court of Appeals did not change the law in its 2005
decision against Gillmor, it merely ruled against her by, inter alia, rejecting her overreaching interpretation of the 1985 Agreement. See Gillmor, 2005 UT App 351 at 1fl[14,
21-23, 25-26, 28-29, 31, 42-43. That the 2005 Gillmor Court disagreed with Gillmors
"belief as to her access rights did not create any new substantive rights in Gillmor or any
other party. Rather, the Court of Appeals merely clarified the parties' existing rights
under the 1985 Agreement. Moreover, a judicial interpretation of a private contract
simply does not and cannot change an actual law.
Gillmor\s second argument is similarly misguided. Gillmor claims that the Utah
Supreme Court changed the "highway-by-use law" in Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2008
UT 10, 179 P.3d 768, "which allows her to bring her Complaint." (Appellant Br. at 12.)
Contrary to Gillmor's argument, the Okelberry decision did not change the law, it
clarified it. Okelberry, 2008 UT 10, \ 15. See Tirozzi v. Shelby Ins. Co., 719 A.2d 62, 66
(Conn. App. 1998) ("[Njeither this court nor our Supreme Court has recognized an
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Id. at f 15 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court did not change the Dedication
Statute in Okelberry, it only clarified it to make it more predictable. Indeed, the Supreme
Court cannot change the language of a statute by judicial decision without violating the
constitutional mandate of separation of powers. See Utah Const. Art. V, ^f 1; accord
Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1976) (stating "a constitutional or
legislative change should come from the sovereign: the people" and observing "there is a
definite distinction between a change in interpretation or application of a statute, which
sometimes quite justifiably occurs, and attempting by judicial fiat to affect a substantial
change in law as clearly expressed in a statute or the constitution.").
Moreover, while the Supreme Court, on certiorari, rejected the Court of Appeals'
interpretation of "continuously used" in the Dedication Statute,3 see Okelberry, 2008 UT
10 at *p2, this does not constitute a change in the law. See Collins, 2002 UT 77 at *|15
(observing there was no change in the law simply because the district court's
interpretation of the law was rejected on appeal); Federated Dept Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,
452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ('The res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed
judgment on the merits [are not] altered by the fact that the judgment may have been
wrong or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.").
Finally, even if the Supreme Court did change the law by rejecting the Court of
Appeals' interpretation of "continuously used," this would not preclude the application of
res judicata to Gillmor's complaint. Gillmor has not demonstrated that her "highway by
3 The Court of Appeals decision appears at Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 2006 UT App
473, 153P.3d745.
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It is well settled that an appellate court may ailum (lu iihignient
appealed from "if ii is sustainable o\\ any legal ground or theory
apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs
from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action, and this is true e\en though such ground or theor\ is not
urged or argued on appeal In appellee, was not raised in the lower
court, ami was not considered or passed on by the lower court."
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Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58 flO, 52 P.3d 1158 (citation omitted). "The goal of the
'affirm on any grounds' rule is judicial economy." Okelberry v. Daniels Land Ass'n, 2005
UTApp3271[ll, 120P.3d34.
The present case is appropriate for affirmance on the alternate grounds of judicial
estoppel. As indicated below, all of the elements of judicial estoppel are met. Both
parties briefed the issue below of whether Gillmor was judicially estopped from
maintaining her claims for private condemnation and highway by use. (R. 48-53, 74-75)
As such, Gillmor is not deprived of notice or an opportunity to address this issue.
Although the trial court concluded that judicial estoppel did not bar Gillmor's claims (R.
100 at 63), this Court is not bound by the trial court's conclusion because the grounds
supporting judicial estoppel are "apparent on the record." Bailey, 2002 UT 58 at ^|10.
B.

Gillmor's claims to make the roads at issue public are barred by
judicial estoppel because she successfully maintained the position in
prior lawsuits that the roads would remain private.

The trial court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply because Gillmor "did
not obtain relief in prior litigation based on any position which she is denying in this
case." (R. 155, ^|2.) Respectfully, Defendants submit that the trial court erred in making
this conclusion. The parties to the 1984 Action settled that case by executing the mutually
beneficial 1985 Agreement, which was specifically approved and adopted by the trial
court. (R. 31, Ex. 3) In the 1985 Agreement, Gillmor's predecessor-in-interest and
husband, Charles F. Gillmor, accepted and successfully maintained the position that the
roads at issue would remain private.

Gillmor herself has since affirmed these
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omitted). Each of these elements is met here.
1.

^S

The prior proceedings and present proceeding invoK e the same parties
or their privies,
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A person in privity with another is one who is "so identified in interest with
another that he represents the same legal right." Searle Bros. v. Searle, 588 P.2d at 691.
A privity relationship includes "a mutual or successive relationship to rights in property."
Id.
As indicated above in regards to claim preclusion (Section 11(B)(1)), there is no
question that the same parties or their privities are involved in all of the proceedings.
Defendants all own parcels formerly owned by Richards, who has been a defendant in all
three actions. Because each defendant not a party to the 1984 or 2001 Actions has a
"successive relationship to rights in property" with Richards, they are privies and this
element of the analysis is satisfied. See id. (See also \ 2 at R. 36.) Ultimately, Gillmor
did not dispute below that this prong of judicial estoppel was established.
2.

The original and subsequent actions involve the same subject matter.

The 1984, 2001 and present actions each involve alleged rights to access the
Gillmor property over the same two roads. All three actions deal with the extent of
Gillmor's rights to use the roads over what was originally Richards' property. Gillmor is
attempting to use a different legal theory, but the subject matter is the same.
In the 1984 Action, Richards verbally challenged the right of people hunting on
Charles F. Gillmor's property to use the two roads at issue—the Perdue Creek road and
the Neil Creek road. (R. 31, Ex. 2, t 4.) See Gillmor, 2005 UT App 351 at 1(2. Charles F.
Gillmor brought suit "to enjoin Richards' interference with his and his family's and
friends' use of the roads and to claim a prescriptive easement over both trails." Id.
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Charles F. Gillmor "claimed the Gillmor family had held a right of way over the dirt
roads . . . ." Id

The relief Nadine Gillmor sought in the 2001 Action was unfettered

access across the Defendants' property via the two roadways—based on misguided
interpretations of the 1985 Agreement. Id. at ^[12. (Defs' Mem. Supp. Partial Summ. J.,
Ex. 1, R. 31.) The relief Gillmor seeks in the present action is unlimited access across the
Defendants' property, once again via the two roadways—this time as a member of the
general public.
It is clear that the same underlying subject matter is involved in all three actions:
the Gillmor family's dogged attempts to gain access, over the same property, via the same
roads. The only thing that has changed is the legal theory employed.
3.

Gillmor is seeking to deny the position, which she successfully
maintained in prior litigation, that the access across Defendants'
property is private and was intended to remain private.

The Gillmors have successfully maintained for over 20 years that the roads are
private. In executing the 1985 Agreement to settle the 1984 Action, Charles F. Gillmor
took the position that the roads were and would remain private:
Gillmor specifically covenants and agrees that he shall not use the
Easements, or allow the Easements to be used by his invitees, agents,
or employees in such a manner so as to cause the Easements to
become part of the public domain. Gillmor specifically covenants
and agrees that he shall not allow the Gillmor Property to be used in
such a manner so as to subject the Easements to demands by the
public for access to any portion of the Gillmor property.
(1985 Agreement, R. 31. at Ex. 3, ^f 2.) Charles F. Gillmor "successfully maintained" this
position by using it to obtain a mutually beneficial settlement of the 1984 Action. Mr.
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Gillmor's counsel in the 1984 Action testified in the 2001 Action that this warranty was
critical to Richards' decision to execute the 1985 Agreement. (R. 114, Ex. 9 and R. 79,
Transcript, p. 154, In. 10-15; p. 160, In. 9-11; p. 183, In. 2-8; p. 196, In. 5-14). The 1985
Agreement was specifically approved and acted on by the court in the 1984 Action. The
court entered the Order and Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice, "[b]ased upon the
Stipulation of the parties herein made in open Court on November 21, 1985 and based
upon the written stipulation filed herein," which was attached to the Order. (R. 31, Ex.
3.)
As recognized by this Court in Gillmor v. Macey, Charles F. Gillmor and his
family, including Nadine Gillmor, reaped the benefits of 1985 Agreement with little
disagreement "for over a decade" by using the roads as set forth in the Agreement. See
2005 UT App 351 at ^ 3-4. Even after disputes arose, Nadine Gillmor brought and
maintained the 2001 Action on rights purportedly stemming from the 1985 Agreement.
Nadine Gillmor in fact made various representations in the 2001 Action that the relief she
sought "would not harm the public interest, because only private property is involved, in
which the public has no interest." (R. 31, Ex. 1, ^ 28.) She further testified that when
Charles F. Gillmor created the easement with Richards "he didn't want [the road] to
become public." (R. 5, R. 2014, March 4, 2002, p. 100:15-16; see Addendum.)
The 1985 Agreement formed the basis for the parties' mutually beneficial
settlement of the 1984 Action and was "accepted and acted upon by the Court." See
Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1242 n.19 (Hawaii 1998) (indicating such action by the
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court precludes a party from "subsequently repudiating a theory of action"). Once this
occurred, Nadine Gillmor, as a privy of Charles F. Gillmor, became judicially estopped
from maintaining the directly inconsistent position in the present litigation that the
roadways are public or ought to be condemned for public use. See id; see also Correia,
614 N.E.2d at 1016. That Gillmor ultimately did not prevail on all of her arguments in
the 2001 Action does not preclude the application of judicial estoppel. Both prior to and
following disposition of the 2001 Action, Gillmor used the roadways under rights flowing
from the 1985 Agreement. After having enjoyed the benefits of the 1985 Agreement for
so long of a period, she cannot now raise new claims that undermine the very warranties
upon which that Agreement was based and upon which the 1984 Action was settled: that
the roads would remain private.

Judicial estoppel was designed to prevent such

machinations by 'prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to
the exigencies of the moment." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001).
4.

Appellees relied on Charles F. Gillmor's warranty and Nadine
Gillmor's affirmation that the roads would remain private.

There was no claim in the 1984 Action that the Perdue Creek or Neil Creek roads
were or had become public. Quite the opposite, to settle the 1984 Action, Charles F.
Gillmor expressly warranted that the roads would not "become part of the public
domain." (1985 Agreement, Ex. 3, <[| 2 to R. 31.) Richards relied on this warranty as a
condition to settling the 1984 Action, {see R. 52) Richards, therefore, relied on this
representation and "changed his position by reason of it." Orvis, 2008 UT 2 at Tfll.
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Moreover, because the 1985 Agreement was recorded against all of the properties
involved, (Ex. 3 to R. 31), Richards' successors-in-interest, the Defendants here, relied on
the warranty against public use of the roads in making their determinations to purchase
their respective properties. Defendants suffered the Gillmor family's use for over 20
years under rights stemming from the 1985 Agreement. Defendants further relied on
Gillmor's affirmation in the 2001 Action that the roads would remain private. Had
Gillmor made her assertions of public use in the 2001 Action, the defendants in that
action would have sought damages and other remedies against Gillmor for breach of the
1985 Agreement, including termination of any right to use the roads under that
Agreement.
Accordingly, for more than 20 years, Gillmor has benefitted from her husband's
representations before the court in connection with the 1985 Agreement and her
affirmation in the 2001 Action that the roads were and would remain strictly private.
Defendants would be prejudiced, and the integrity of the judicial system subverted, if
Gillmor is allowed to avoid the results of the 1984 and 2001 Actions now.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF RULE 11(b)(2) SANCTIONS AGAINST
PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL WAS PROPER.
The trial court awarded sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Utah R. Civ. P.

11(b)(2), which states that by presenting a pleading, an attorney is certifying that to the
best of the attorney's knowledge, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances:
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[T]he claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.
The trial court awarded sanctions under this section based on its finding that the
action was clearly barred by res judicata and therefore "not legally justified" by existing
law. See Ruling, R. 195 at 204. The trial court further noted that given the state of the
law, it was "at a loss to understand how plaintiff could have brought the present action
without violating Rule 11(b)(2)." Id. at R. 202. The trial court's award of sanctions is
supported by the record, and Gillmor's counsel fails to show that the imposition of
sanctions in this case constitutes reversible error.
The law is clear that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate when a plaintiff seeks to
avoid the affect of a final decision on the merits of her claims by filing a new proceeding.
See Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); accord
Satterfield v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4180 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2005) ("Courts
have imposed sanctions where plaintiffs knew or should have known that their claims
were barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel"); Estate of Blue v. County of Los
Angeles, 120 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 1997) ("When a reasonable investigation would
reveal that a claim is barred by res judicata or collateral estoppel... Rule 11 sanctions may
be imposed within the district court's discretion."); Williams v. Fla. Health Scis. Ctr.,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13006 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2007) ("Rule 11 sanctions are
appropriate where a party files a claim barred by res judicata"" (citing Thomas v. Evans,
880 F.2d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 1989)). Sanctions are appropriate where the second
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lawsuit brings new claims when the new claims could or should have been brought in the
previous action.

King v. Hoover Group, Inc., 958 F.2d 219, 223 (8th Cir. 1992)

(upholding award of sanctions stating that "res judicata bars relitigation not only of those
matters that were actually litigated, but also those which could have been litigated in the
earlier proceeding.")
In her brief, Gillmor argues that sanctions should not have been awarded because
"all Rule 11 requires is good faith and that an attorney make a reasonable inquiry into the
validity of the action, which Gillmor's attorney did."4 (Br. of Appellant, p. 13.) Gillmor
cites to Barnard v. Sutliff 'in support of this contention.
In Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229 at 1236 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
held that "the reasonableness of an attorney's view of the law is not a subjective
standard...the attorney's view must be objectively reasonable when it is compared to
existing law." In Barnard, the trial court ruled that an attorney violated Rule 11 by
failing to properly research the court's jurisdiction before filing a suit seeking to enjoin a
bar disciplinary proceeding against him where the Utah Constitution gives the Utah
4 Gillmor appears to argue that a finding of bad faith is required before a violation can be
found under Rule 11(b)(2). (Br. of Appellant, p. 16.) This argument directly contradicts
Utah law:
While bad faith may often be associated with violation of subparts (2) or (3)
[of Rule 11(b)], such is not a necessary element. See Pennington v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 932,939 n.3 (Utah 1998) (citing Taylor v. Estate of
Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 171 n. 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). A lawyer may
bring frivolous or inadequately supported claims merely by failing to
exercise the minimal required level of professional care and judgment.
Crank v. State Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8, \ 33; 20 P.3d 307 (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court original jurisdiction over all such actions. In response to the motion for
sanctions, the attorney submitted an affidavit which explained that he had been led to
believe that the district court was the proper forum for his suit because he had previously
successfully filed two similar suits which were decided on the merits by the district court.
However, the attorney did not describe any steps he had undertaken to research the law
underlying the jurisdictional question. The district court granted the motion for sanctions.
Thereafter, the attorney filed an objection challenging the court's findings on the merits
of the Rule 11 motion. In support of his objection, the attorney filed a second affidavit in
which he outlined in detail the steps he took in conducting his legal research. The district
court denied the attorney's objection.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed the award of sanctions on two
grounds. First, the Court found that "[although the rule 11 duty to investigate the law is
premised on the need for actual research, the personal knowledge of how coordinate
courts have resolved similar issues is relevant in deciding whether an attorney made a
reasonable inquiry into the law." Id. at 1236. Second, the Court noted that the law was
not reasonably clear that the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over the type of
action brought by the attorney.5
The present case is distinguishable from Barnard, because in this case Gillmor's
counsel failed to offer any explanation to the trial court of what steps he had taken to

5 Similarly, in affirming the denial of Rule 11 sanctions in Hess v. Johnson, 2007 UT
App 213, ^ 12, 163 P.3d 747, the Utah Supreme Court found that earlier case law did not
clearly foreclose plaintiffs claims, and sanctions were therefore unwarranted.
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inquire into the validity of this action other than to state baldly that he "researched the law
and determined that Gillmor did have a new basis to file a Complaint following the Court
of Appeals decision." See Plaintiffs Memo, in Opp. to Defendants5 Motion for Rule 11
Sanctions, p. 5 (R. 162). The application of Barnard for which Gillmor's counsel argues
ignores the clear instructions of the Utah Supreme Court that the focus of the "reasonable
inquiry" analysis "should be on what the attorney actually did in researching the law" and
would never result in the imposition of sanctions against counsel since all an attorney
would have to do to avoid sanctions is affirmatively state that he "researched the law".
Id
Given the absence of any explanation as to the research undertaken, the trial court
properly focused its analysis on whether "there [was] an objectively reasonable basis in
law justifying [Gillmor s counsel's] new approach to Ms. Gillmor's apparently intractable
problem of how to obtain access to her property." (Br. of Appellant, p. 7.) It properly
concluded there was not.
In opposition to defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the trial court, Gillmor offered
the following justifications. First, Gillmor argued to the trial court that her claims in this
action were not barred because except for the "theoretical possibility of them, [the claims]
did not practically exist until the Court of Appeals decision". (R. 160) However, at the
December 19, 2007 hearing, Gillmor's counsel argued that the road-by-use claim was
based on public use which occurred before the 1984 (first) lawsuit, and acknowledged it
could have been asserted in the 1984 Action. (R. 110 at 25-27.)
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Gillmor also argued that her claims in this action were unnecessary until the Court
of Appeals decision in the 2001 Action, and therefore res judicata should not apply. (R.
160) It may well be that Gillmor was so sure that her interpretation of the Easement
Agreement would prevail in the 2001 Action that she did not think she needed to plead
any alternative claims. However, Gillmor failed to provide any support for her argument
that being wrong about the strength of her claims avoids the application of res judiciata to
other claims that were omitted as a matter of strategy or otherwise in the prior action.
Finally, Gillmor never provided the trial court with any legal authority that
supported her assertion that "equitable" factors might justify the non-application of res
judicata in any case, let alone this case. The two cases that Gillmor relied upon (p. 2,3 of
Gillmor's October 10, 2007 Memo, R. 71, 72.) consisted of statements from dissenting or
non-majority opinions. Further, Gillmor failed to provide the trial court with any policy
reasons that might warrant the extension of any of the dissenting opinions she cited into
the arena of real property law, an area where finality is especially important.
The trial court rejected Gillmor's arguments and concluded that this suit was
clearly barred by the res judicata effect of the 2001 judgment. (Rule 11 Order, p. 8) (R.
202.) Specifically, the Court noted that it was "unaware of any exceptions to application
of the bar imposed by res judicata, and plaintiff ha[d] not identified any such exception."
(Id.) These findings are supported by the record, and fully support the award of Rule
11(b)(2) sanctions.
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Gillmor's new arguments concerning res judicata before this Court are equally
unavailing. As demonstrated in Section II above, none of the cases she cites provide a
basis for denying application of res judicata, and there has been no change in the law.
This Court should therefore affirm the award of sanctions pursuant to Rule 11(b)(2), and
impose additional sanctions in this appeal under Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON CROSS APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Did the Trial Court Err in Refusing to Grant Sanctions Under Rule

11(b)(1)?
a) Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's Rule 11 determination,
we review the trial court's findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, the trial
court's conclusion that Rule 11 was violated under a correction of error standard, and the
trial court's determination of the type and amount of sanction to be imposed under an
abuse of discretion standard." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah
Ct. App. 1993) citing Barnard v. Sutliff, 846 P.2d 1229, 1235 (Utah 1992)
b) Issue Preserved for Appeal: Defendants preserved this claim of error at R. 126127.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ON CROSS APPEAL
The trial court did err in concluding that Gillmor did not violate Rule 11(b)(1) by
filing this action. Gillmor's purpose was to avoid the decisions of the courts which have
previously heard claims for greater access to her property over the Perdue Creek and Neil
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Creek roads and denied those claims. Such a purpose is improper for Rule 11 analysis as
a matter of law.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING RULEll(b)(l) SANCTIONS.
A.

The trial court erred in characterizing Gillmor's purpose.

Defendants sought sanctions in the trial court against Gillmor and her attorney
under Rule 11(b)(1) which states that by presenting a pleading an attorney is certifying
that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances that:
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
One such improper purpose identified by this Court is the avoidance of the res
judicata effect of prior decisions. In Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584
(Utah App. 1990) {Schoney I), plaintiff brought a variety of claims against defendants, all
of which were disposed of by a default judgment. The trial court's grant of a default
judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the Utah Supreme Court denied
review. A year after the Court of Appeals decision and four months after the Supreme
Court denied review, plaintiff moved for appointment of a class representative in the trial
court to pursue the case, an action that was "no different from filing a new complaint
containing the original claims." Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (UT App
1993) (Schoney II) at 60, n.l. In Schoney II, the trial court denied the motion and
awarded defendant costs and fees as Rule 11 sanctions. The Court of Appeals affirmed
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the award of sanctions on the grounds that plaintiffs effort to avoid the res judicata effect
of the prior decisions was "unconscionable and without reason." It held, "no proper
purpose can be justified by ignoring the rulings of foregoing tribunals." Id. at 62.
In this case, the trial court denied the request for sanctions against Gillmor under
Rule 11(b)(1) on the ground that Gillmor's purpose was not improper. (R. 198-200) The
trial court erred in characterizing Gillmor's purpose and denying Rule 11 sanctions on
that basis.
In denying sanctions under Rule 11(b)(1), the trial court held "[Gillmor's] purpose
is clear - to obtain access that has not been obtained through previously advanced
theories." (R. 200) By characterizing Gillmor's purpose in this way, the trial court
ignored the teaching of Schoney and the burdens and expense imposed on defendants
when a party brings a series of lawsuits making different claims each time but all with the
same underlying goal. On the trial court's reasoning, no matter how many lawsuits
Gillmor brings, none will have an improper purpose because in every case her "purpose"
will be to obtain access to her property.
After the first, or surely second, lawsuit with the same goal, the purpose of the next
lawsuit is correctly characterized as avoiding the effect of the prior decisions. Such a
purpose is improper and should be sanctioned under Rule 11(b)(1).
B.

The test for improper purpose is objective.

In determining that Gillmor did not file this action for an improper purpose, the
trial court also considered whether Gillmor acted with subjective bad faith as defined
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under U.C.A. §78-27-56. (R. 199) However, the test under Rule 11(b)(1) of whether a
purpose is improper is an objective inquiry and does not require a finding of subjective
bad faith. The Utah Supreme Court has specifically distinguished Rule 11 sanctions in
cases where actions are brought for an improper purpose from those awarded under
U.C.A. §78-27-56 saying, "In contrast [to sanctions under §78-27-56], Rule 11 sanctions
do not require a party to act with a lack of good faith." Pennington v. Allstate Insurance
Co., 973 P. 2d 932, 939 n. 3 (Utah 1998).
C.

Gillmor and her counsel were aware that res judicata barred this
action.

Gillmor's counsel acknowledged during the December 19, 2007 hearing on
defendants' Motion to Dismiss that he and Gillmor knew that the doctrine of res judicata
was going to present an obstacle to Gillmor"s claims in this action. As Gillmor's counsel
acknowledged, he had anticipated the res judicata issue, and it was laid out clearly by
counsel for defendants in the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Sanctions sent to
counsel before the motion to dismiss was filed. (R. 110 at p. 23, 1. 25.) Counsel also
admitted advising Gillmor that the Defendants' had "a pretty good argument in this case
[on claim preclusion]." (R. 110 at p. 31,1. 2.)
Counsel for Gillmor further acknowledged that the claims brought in this action
could have been brought in the 2001 Action, but it would have been "dicey" to do so
because at that time Gillmor was arguing that she had extensive private rights to use the
roads under the Easement Agreement. (R. 110 at p. 40) Failing to plead an available
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claim because it might weaken other, stronger claims, litigating the stronger claims
through all available appeals and then a year and a half later bringing the weaker claims
in another suit is exactly the kind of behavior that res judicata was aimed at preventing.
D.

Gillmor and her counsel remain undeterred by successive rulings
against Gillmor.

In the course of the hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, counsel for
Gillmor made clear that Gillmor would not accept the Court's ruling as a final end to her
efforts to gain greater access to her property across the Perdue Creek and Neil Creek
roads. Counsel stated that no judicial economy would be achieved by a dismissal of this
action on the basis of res judicata because if the action were dismissed, he would "bring
[the road by use claim] in somebody else's name." At one point in the argument,
Gillmor's counsel stated that he would "find somebody off the street" to bring the road by
use claim. (R. 110 at 33.)
In fact, counsel for Gillmor has done exactly what he threatened to do.

In

December 2007, he brought the road by use claim against the Defendants in the name of
Gillmor's daughter, Sheila Williams. Williams v. Family Link, LLC et aL, Civil No.
080500855, Third Judicial District Court. It is thus clear that the sanctions imposed by
the trial court solely against Gillmor's counsel have had no deterrent effect at all.
Sanctions should also have been awarded against Nadine Gillmor and her counsel under
the objective standards of Rule 11(b)(1).
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's determination that Gillmor's claims are barred by res judicata and
ts award of sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Rule 11(b)(2) should be affirmed,
sanctions should also be awarded as a result of this appeal by Gillmor. The trial court's
Ienial of sanctions against Gillmor and her counsel under Rule 11(b)(1) should be
eversed. The case should be remanded for a detemiination and award of sanctions under
lule 11(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2009.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorney for Family Link, LLC
Kenneth W. Macey and Robin A. Macey

Elizabeth T. Dunning
Q
Cjl (]\&J)
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
299 South Main, Suite. 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Edvvin C. Barnes
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CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's determination that Gillmor's claims are barred by res judicata and
its award of sanctions against Gillmor's counsel under Rule 11(b)(2) should be affirmed.
Sanctions should also be awarded as a result of this appeal by Gillmor. The trial court's
denial of sanctions against Gillmor and her counsel under Rule 11(b)(1) should be
reversed. The case should be remanded for a determination and award of sanctions under
Rule 11(b)(1), U.R.Civ.P. and Rule 33(b), U.R.App.P.
DATED this 9th day of March, 2009.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorney for Family Link, LLC
Kenneth W. Macey and Robin A. Macey

Elizabeth T. Dunning
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP
299 South Main, Suite. 1800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Edwin C. Barnes
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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ADDENDUM
1.

The attached page (100) of the trial transcript was referred to and quoted

from in the record in the trial court at R. 51, but was inadvertently not attached to the
pleadings in the trial court.
2.

Rulell,U.R.Civ.P.

r
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INDEX
Witness: Nadine Gillnor
Direct ExanInation by Mr. Scofleld
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IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Witness: Jed Uilde

)
) CIVIL NO. 010600155
)
Plaintiff,
) BENCH TRIAL
J
vs.
) March 4, 2002
ROBIN MACEY, KEN MACEY,
) Volune I
FAMILY LINK, LLC, a Utah )
United liability conpany, ) REPORTED BY:
DAVID K. RICHARDS t CO., ) RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
a Utah corporation,
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J
Defendants.
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Direct Examination by Mr. Price
Cross Exanination by Mr. Meade
Cross Examination by Ms. Dunning
Redirect Examination by Mr. Price
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NADINE GILLMOR,
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at the Third District Court, 8300 North SilvercreeR
Drive, Park City, Utah, connencing at 9:0B a.n. on
March 4, 2002, before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder.
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Suite 700
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KEITH W. MEADE
Attorney at Law
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Suite 500
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ERIC G. MAXFIELD
Attorneys at Law
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PAGE 99

brief, your Honor, cited nany cases. I haven't found
a Utah case specifically on this issue of
negotiations leading to an instrunent, but the cases
I have cited are all on 803, sub 3, or analogous
rules on the adnissibility of this type of evidence
in that regard.
What I think is that there are statenents
that are nade and there are obviously concessions
that are nade off of those statenents, and it's the
evolutionary process that's involved that I think
will provide the court with the neaning that's
attached to the ultinate docunent.
THE COURT: Response?
MS. DUNNING: Yeah. Judge, it's, I think.
the very difference that you raised a ninute ago.
This is being offered, this testinony ~ Frank said,
"I'll never give up any of ny rights" — to
contradict the terns of the agreenent. That's
different than testinony about his understanding of
what the agreenent said. We know what the positions
of the parties were, going into litigation and right
before trial. We've got the conplaints and we've got
the trial order, so that —
THE COURT: And that goes to your
illustrations and the statenent which every one of us
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Gillnor expressed his understanding of what this
agreenent was he was about to sign and what rights he
would or would not be giving up?
A
The way this cane about —
Q
Right now I'n just asking who was present
when he nade those statenents.
A
Oh. There was Steve Gillnor, Janes
Elegante, Frank Gillnor and nyself.
Q
Okay. Was Derek Langton present as well?
A
Yes. Yes.
Q
And what did Mr. Gillnor express concerning
his understanding of the agreenent he was about to
sign?
A
He turned to Mr. Elegante and he said, "If
I give up ny rights to Neil Creek." and at that point
Steve says, "No, we can't give then up because
there's too nany landslides. We've got to have a
provision in there of, in case of an energency, we
can get aninals and ourself out."
Q
Okay. But that was before this final —
A
This was the final — to get there.
Q
Yeah, but I'n talking about the final
version. Let's focus on the — because this one has
the provision for energency access to the highway.
A
That's right.
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has dealt with, I never will, I never will, and write
the check, and so I'n not sure about its relevance,
even if it's adnissible. I want to give you sone
latitude here. I want to hear what happened, how
they got to the point of the understanding, such as
It was, but I'n not going to accept the statenent,
for exanple, just as I will never, unless he said
that "and write that in the danned agreenent," for
exanple. I nean, it has to go to the agreenent. So
I'n sustaining the objection on that single question,
but I'll give you sone latitude here.
Q
(BY MR. SCOFIELDJ Before Mr. Gillnor
signed Exhibit 1, did he express to you what his
understanding was of what he would or would not be
giving up?
A
Ue discussed it.
Q
And was that at the courthouse?
A
Yes.
Q
During the course of these negotiations
you've described?
A
Yes.
Q
And was that — and I'n talking
specifically about the final draft of this agreenent
right before he signed it, not any prior iterations
in the discussions. Who was present at the tine Mr.
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Q
So I just want to know, before he signed
this, if he expressed his understanding of what this
docunent was.
A
Yes. He said then, "I'n not giving U P any
of ny rights in Perdue Creek."
THE COURT: In Perdue Creek?
THE WITNESS: In Perdue Creek.
Q
(BY MR. SCOFIELD) Did Mr. Gillnor, at that
sane point in tine, express any understanding about
the issue in this docunent concerning not allowing
the easenent to be used so that it would becone part
of the public donain?
A
Absolutely.
Q
And what did he express in that regard?
A
He said he didn't want it to becone public,
either.
Q
Before Mr. Gillnor signed this Exhibit 1,
did he nake any expressions about his understanding
of whether this agreenent had anything to do with his
historical rights on Perdue Creek Road?
A
He nade it very — he asked Mr. Elegante
tine and tine again if this was giving UP anything of
his rights to what he had done in the past and his
ability to get in and out, and at that point, other
than the hunters that was concerned, that was the
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RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND
OTHER PAPERS; REPRESENTATIONS TO COURT; SANCTIONS
(a) Signature.
(a)(1) Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record, or, if the party is not represented by the party.
(a)(2) A person may sign a paper using any form of signature recognized by
law as binding. Unless required by statute, a paper need not be accompanied
by affidavit or have a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature. If a rule
requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature, the
person may submit a declaration pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-5-101. If
a statute requires an affidavit or a notarized, verified or acknowledged signature and the party electronically files the paper, the signature shall be notarized
pursuant to Utah Code Section 46-1-16.
(a)(3) An unsigned paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is
corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or
other paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating),
an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under
the circumstances,
(b)(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(b)(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(b)(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(b)(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject
to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the
attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(c)(1) How initiated.
(c)(1)(A) By motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. In appropriate
102

circumstances, a law firm may be held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, members, and employees.
(c)(1)(B) On court's initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an
order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated
subdivision (b) with respect thereto.
(c)(2) Nature of sanction; limitations.
A sanction imposed for violation of
this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations
in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives
of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(c)(2)(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party
for a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(c)(2)(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative
unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(c)(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
[Amended effective September 4, 1985; April 1, 1997; April 1, 2008J
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